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INTRODUCTION

The two recent Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases-Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown' and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro -are "transnational" cases and involve the jurisdictional reach of a
court in the United States over foreign defendants when a U.S. plaintiff seeks a
forum in the United States. 3 In Goodyear, a case of general jurisdiction, the

North Carolina plaintiffs were killed in a bus accident in Paris, France, resulting
from an allegedly defective tire manufactured by foreign subsidiaries of
Goodyear USA. 4 The plaintiffs argued that there was jurisdiction over the
foreign manufacturers in North Carolina because the foreign defendants also sold5
their product (or similar ones) in the United States, including in North Carolina.

*Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. My appreciation
to
the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for its financial support of this
research.
1.
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
2.
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
3.
Both actions were brought in the respective state courts. Under existing law, the
jurisdictional reach of the federal courts in those states would have been no broader. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
4.
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
5.
See Brief for Respondents at 43, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131
S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 5125441, at *43.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2012

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 591

In Nicastro, which presented a case of specific jurisdiction, the New Jersey
plaintiff was injured by a metal-shearing machine in a work-related accident in
New Jersey. 6 The press was manufactured in England, where the defendant was
incorporated, and the machines were distributed in the United States through the
English manufacturer's independent Ohio distributor. 7 Although there is little
said in either Goodyear or Nicastro that indicates the Justices believed that there
should be any difference of treatment between domestic defendants in the
interstate context and foreign defendants in the international context, the
Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
of California8-with its "reasonableness"
prong 9-- certainly could be read to
10
distinction.
a
such
just
have made
In thinking about jurisdiction in the international marketplace, two different
perspectives-a transnational one and a comparative one-may be useful in
assessing the two recent Supreme Court decisions. A transnational perspective
raises the question of whether there should be a distinct jurisdictional analysis
for these cross-border cases, and in particular, whether and how a foreign
defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole might be factored into
such an analysis. There are various possibilities, including that of congressional
action, to change the "minimum contacts" inquiry in regard to the defendant's
activity from that of contacts with a particularstate to contacts with the United
States as a whole." A comparative look at the two cases provides insight into
the structure of other countries' jurisdictional regimes in mirror transnational
cases to Goodyear and Nicastro, and reveals the different values reflected in
other systems' jurisdictional rules. In Nicastro, Justice Ginsburg's dissent called
attention to the European Union Regulation on Jurisdiction and Judgments (the
Brussels Regulation).1 2 She observed that United States plaintiffs are at a
disadvantage in comparison to plaintiffs who seek to acquire jurisdiction over
foreign defendants who cause an injury in their forum state,' 3 as was the
situation in Nicastro. The particular procedural burdens that defendants face in
defending in courts in the United States (as opposed to defending in courts in
other countries)-such as exposure to juries, class actions, and discovery-may

6. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
7. Id.
8.
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
9. Id.at113.
10. Id.at 114 ("The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long

arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.").
11. As discussed in greater detail at text accompanying notes 130-134 infra, I believe an
aggregate contacts approach is appropriate for specific jurisdiction but not for general jurisdiction.
12. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 & n.16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Council
Regulation 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4 [hereinafter EU Regulation] (amended by
Commission Regulation 1496/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 225) (amending Annex I & II))).
13. Id. at 2803.
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be more significant than Justice Ginsburg acknowledges, at least to the extent

she is comparing relative "advantages" and "disadvantages" of suit in particular
fora. But she is certainly correct that the place of injury is a well-accepted
jurisdictional basis elsewhere; 14 indeed, that rule is embraced in national law in
many countries of the15 world and is not limited to regional arrangements within
the European Union.
II.

SHOULD THERE BE A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR TRANSNATIONAL CASES?

A.

The ReasonablenessStandardof Asahi

Although the constitutional test for jurisdiction set forth in International
Shoe Co. v. Washingtonl6 -that a defendant have "certain minimum contacts

with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'" 17 -was hardly a brightline rule, the subsequent enactment of state specific-act statutes and some
18
guidance from the Supreme Court achieved some measure of predictability.
Something of a sea change came in Asahi, when the Supreme Court not only
delivered a 4-to-4 split on the issue of what actually sufficed for "minimum
contacts"' 19 (does a defendant's act of placing goods-in that case, a component
part-into the stream of commerce suffice?), but also added as an element of the
constitutional20 inquiry whether the assertion of jurisdiction would be
"reasonable.,
It is interesting to note that the Part II-B "unreasonableness"
prong of Asahi was not subscribed to by all of the Justices who split 4-to-4 on
the minimum contacts point. 21 Justice Scalia, the only present Justice who

14. See id. (citing EU Regulation, art. 5, supra note 12, at 4).
15. See OscAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 504 (Oscar
G. Chase & Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007).
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
18. The traditional "minimum contacts" test required that the defendant's activities in the
state be balanced against the state's regulatory and litigation interests-hence the requirement that
the defendant have "certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers"
for International Shoe (and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International
Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 759 (1995) [hereinafter Silberman, Two Cheers] (quoting Int'l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added)). As reformulated in Asahi, the test now appears to be a
formal two-step process, where "minimum contacts" must first be satisfied, and if the requisite
contacts are found, the court proceeds to assess jurisdiction on more general "reasonableness"
grounds. See id. at 760-61.
19. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
(O'Connor, J.), with id. at 116-117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens did not join
the "minimum contacts" part of the opinion because it was "not necessary to the Court's decision."
Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
20. See id. at 113-14.
21. See id. at 105.
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remains from the Asahi court, looked no further than the lack of minimum
contacts.22

Indeed, because Asahi was a case involving a foreign defendant, one might
have concluded that the Court had added the reasonableness prong as an element
of comity when jurisdiction was to be asserted over a foreign-country
defendant. The claim before the Court in Asahi was an indemnity claim by the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube against the Japanese component
manufacturer of the valve part. 24 And the Court's opinion on reasonableness
highlighted the fact that Asahi was a Japanese corporation and noted that the
"unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal
system" should be given significant weight in making that assessment. 25
However, the post-Asahi cases in the state and federal courts did not limit
the reasonableness prong to foreign-country defendants, 26 although my own
read of many of the cases suggests that most of the cases that ultimately invoke
unreasonableness as the basis for rejecting specific jurisdiction actually
involve foreign defendants.
But extracting such a principle is difficult
because only a few years before in the Supreme Court's decision in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall28-a general jurisdiction
case involving a Colombian defendant 29-no mention of reasonableness was
made. Of course, that may be because the Justices determined that the
defendant's activity was insufficient to account for general jurisdiction, and
thus there was no reason for such an issue to be addressed. Alternatively, there
seems to be some doubt as to whether the reasonableness prong applies in

22. See id.
23. See Brief for the Am. Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom & the
Confederation of British Indus. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (No. 85-693), 1986 WL 727584, at *15 (urging a specialized
jurisdictional standard for foreign defendants); Gary B. Born, Reflections on JudicialJurisdictionin
International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 27-34 (1987) [hereinafter Born, Reflections]
(offering support for a separate jurisdictional standard when foreign defendants are involved in
transnational litigation).
24. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
25. Id.at 114.
26. See, e.g., LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 733 N.E.2d 883, 889 (N.Y. 2000) (citing Asahi,
480 U.S. at 106-07) (state court, Texas defendant); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.,
84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113) (federal court, Delaware
defendant).
27. See, e.g., Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2008) (defendant is
a Japanese manufacturer); TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd., 488 F.3d
1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007) (defendant is a Dutch-owned insurance company); Benton v. Cameco
Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2004) (defendant is a Canadian seller of uranium); Core-Vent
Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 1 F.3d 1482, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendants are Swedish doctors).
28. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
29. Id. at 409.
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cases of general jurisdiction, 30 even31 though general jurisdiction may present
the strongest case for its invocation.
Perhaps the reasonableness prong does not emerge in either Goodyear or
Nicastro for the same reason it was not part of the discussion in Helicopteros:
the Court determined that the requirement of minimum contacts was not met,
and thus had no reason to proceed further. If these decisions signal the Court's
retreat from its two-part analysis of minimum contacts and reasonableness, there
would be no quarrel from me. I have previously criticized Asahi, arguing that
reasonableness is an indeterminate standard for a constitutional test and that
concerns about the burdens on a foreign defendant can be taken care of by a
nuanced
doctrine of forum non conveniens that leaves the discretion to the trial
32
court.

1.

Why a Separate Test for TransnationalCases

Whatever vehicle is invoked, special concerns may warrant attention to the
foreign status of the defendant in thinking about appropriate forum access
rules, 33 but those concerns can point in opposite directions. One fundamental
question in the United States is whether a foreign defendant can even invoke the
protections of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has answered that
question "yes," at least as regards private defendants. 34 In determining as a
matter of policy whether there should be different considerations when

30. See, e.g., Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 577 (Walker, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
application of reasonableness standard in domestic case of general jurisdiction, noting that the
Supreme Court had not yet instructed that the reasonableness inquiry should be applied to assertions
of general jurisdiction); cf. Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1993) (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113) (indicating in a case involving foreign defendant that the
reasonableness standard of Asahi was not limited to the specific jurisdiction context).
31. In most cases of general jurisdiction, the connection between the forum state and the
particular claim is attenuated, and thus the reasonableness factors may have a more significant role
to play in ensuring an appropriate forum. See B. Glenn George, In Search of GeneralJurisdiction,
64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1129, 1138 (1990). In particular, the "procedural and substantive policies of
other nations"-identified in Asahi-have particular resonance in transnational cases of general
jurisdiction. Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 807, 900-01 (2004).
32. See Silberman, Two Cheers, supra note 18, at 759-60, 766; see also Howard B. Stravitz,
Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REv. 729,
805 (1988) ("[Tlhe current test is difficult to apply, and is unlikely to promote consistent and
predictable results.").
33. I use the term "forum access" because it is not only formal rules of jurisdiction that
determine the proper forum, but also, at least in common law countries, the additional mechanism of
forum non conveniens. Thus, "special concerns" with respect to the transnational case, and in
particular the foreign defendant, might be taken into account through either formal jurisdictional
rules or via forum non conveniens.
34. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 & n.*, 114-15. See also Born, Reflections, supra note 23, at 2122. As regards foreign states, however, the Supreme Court has questioned whether foreign states
are "persons" protected by the Due Process Clause. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 308 (5th ed. 2011).
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jurisdiction is asserted over a foreign defendant, there are competing concerns.
On the one hand, there is concern that the plaintiff, if he cannot sue the foreign
defendant in the United States, may not be able to sue at all. The burdens of
travel, distance, and costs-as well as access to a lawyer abroad-may make
litigation abroad impractical or impossible. 35 On the other hand, a foreign
defendant who is sued in the United States faces burdens of cost and distance,
particularly since the U.S. system is one of the few that requires a defendant to
pay its own legal fees even if ultimately successful. More generally, domestic
institutions and attitudes within a particular country can differ markedly from
36
those in foreign states, increasing the litigation burden of the foreign defendant.
Thus, there is reason for a judicial system to take into account the impact of its
unique procedures when designing its forum access rules over foreign defendants
in transnational cases. 37 Judicial systems vary in numerous ways, including rules
about cost-shifting or not; regimes of criminal and civil liability, such as an
action civile in some countries; and as regards the United States, its rules on

juries, and discovery that have not found broad acceptance
class actions,
38
elsewhere.

2.

The Question of a Separate Standardin Canada

Interestingly, the issue of whether there should be a different jurisdictional
standard over foreign defendants in transnational cases was recently before the
Supreme Court of Canada on appeal from Charron Estate v. Village Resorts
Ltd.,39 which joined two cases-Van Breda v. Village Resorts Limited and
Charron v. Bel Air Travel. Both cases involved suits against domestic and

foreign defendants brought by Canadian plaintiffs who were killed or seriously
injured at resorts in Cuba. 40 In an earlier series of Ontario cases-the "Muscutt

35. See Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 850-51 (1lth Cir.
1988) (stating that any inconvenience to foreign defendants is overridden by the greater
inconvenience of requiring plaintiff to "pursue its cause of action in a foreign forum").
36. See Born, Reflections, supra note 23, at 24-26.
37. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over
NonresidentAlien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 54-55 (2006) (arguing that the interests
of foreign states and sovereignty concerns are the basis for limiting the jurisdictional reach of U.S.
courts over foreign defendants).
38. This is only to say that a state should have a strong justification to provide a forum in
light of its unique procedures that will be applicable.
39. (2010), 98 O.R. 3d 721 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, 2010
CarswellOnt 4917 (WL) & 2010 CarswellOnt 4829 (WL). The Supreme Court of Canada issued its
opinion on April 18, 2012. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, available at Judgments
of the Supreme Court of Canada, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, http://scc.lexum.org/en/2012/
2012sccl7/2012sccl7.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
40. In Charron, the Ontario husband and wife had booked an all-inclusive vacation package
to Cuba through an Ontario travel agent. The husband was killed while scuba-diving at the Cuban
resort, and the estate and family brought suit in Ontario against numerous defendants, including the
Cuban resort, the Cayman management company that manages the resort, the Cuban scuba diving
equipment provider, the diving instructor, and the captain of the diving boat. Charron Estate, 98
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Ontario Court of Appeal decided five companion cases
Quintet"4 1-the
evaluating an assertion of jurisdiction based upon damage suffered by plaintiffs
in Ontario.42 The cases involved plaintiffs who returned to Ontario following
accidents elsewhere.43 One of the cases involved an accident in another province
against provincial defendants, 44 whereas the other cases involved accidents

O.R. 3d 721, paras. 2, 5-6. In Van Breda, an Ontario couple had arranged a trip to a different
Cuban resort through an Ontario defendant who operated a web-based business. The male of the
couple had agreed to work as a part-time tennis instructor in exchange for the trip. His female
partner was injured while using the resort's exercise equipment and was rendered a paraplegic. Suit
was brought in Ontario against several defendants, including the Cuban resort and the Cayman
corporation that operated and managed the resort. Id. at paras. 9-12. Service on the foreign
defendants in both cases was based on the procedural rules of Ontario, see id. para. 7; para. 13,
which authorize service outside the jurisdiction, inter alia, where the contract was made in Ontario,
Ont. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, s. 17.02(f)(i); where the defendants carry on
business in Ontario, id. at s. 17.02(p); where damages were sustained in Ontario, id. at s. 17.02(h);
and where out-of-province defendants are necessary and proper parties to a proceeding properly
brought against another person served in Ontario, id. at s. 17.02(o).
41. Muscutt v. Courcelles (2002), 60 O.R. 3d 20 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Leufkens v. Alba Tours
Int'l Inc. (2002), 60 O.R. 3d 84 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Lemmex v. Sunflight Holidays Inc. (2002), 60
O.R. 3d 54 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Sinclair v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (2002), 60 O.R. 3d
76 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Gajraj v. DeBernardo (2002), 60 O.R. 3d 68 (Can. Ont. C.A.). See generally
JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL & JANET WALKER, 1 CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11.5, at 11-3711-45 (6th ed. 2005).
42. Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d 20, para. 10; Leufkens, 60 O.R. 3d 84, para. 11; Lemmex, 60 O.R. 3d
54, para. 26; Sinclair,60 O.R. 3d 76, para. 11; Gajraj,60 O.R. 3d 68, para. 11. See also Ont. Rules
of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, s. 17.02(h) (authorizing service outside Ontario for
claims "in respect of damage sustained in Ontario arising from tort, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty or breach of confidence, wherever committed"). In Canada, judicial jurisdiction, at
least in the first instance, is a function of provincial law. There is now a uniform statute on judicial
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens-the Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer
Act (CJPTA)-but it has only been adopted in a few provinces, not including Ontario. See Uniform
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, C. 28 (Can.), available at
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/UniformCourtJurisdiction_+_Proceedings-TransferActEn.pdf;
Enforcement Law Projects, UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CAN., http://www.ulcc.ca/
en/cls/index.cfm?sec=3 (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). The CJPTA contains a list of provisions (for
instance, contracts claims where the contractual obligations were to be performed in the province
and tort claims where the tort was committed in the province) that presumptively establish a "real
and substantial connection." CJPTA, supra, s. 10. In addition, it remains open to the plaintiff to
establish other connections. See generally Vaughan Black & Stephen G.A. Pitel, Reform of
Ontario'sLaw on Jurisdiction,47 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 469, 479 (2009) (stating that the CJPTA's
list is not exclusive and it "remains open to the plaintiff to establish the required connection in cases
not wholly covered by the listed presumptions"). The Canadian Supreme Court, in its April 18,
2012, decision in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (affirming the Charron and Van
Breda decisions), clarified that the factors in rule 17.02 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure
relate to situations in which service out of the province is allowed and were not adopted as conflicts
However, because the rules represent an "expression of wisdom and
rules of jurisdiction.
experience drawn from the life of the law," some of them "are based on objective facts that may
also indicate when courts can properly assume jurisdiction." Id. at para. 83.
43. Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d 20, paras. 4-5; Leufkens, 60 O.R. 3d 84, paras. 2-9; Lemmex, 60
O.R. 3d 54, paras. 2-14; Sinclair,60 O.R. 3d 76, paras. 2-6; Gajraj,60 O.R. 3d 68, paras. 2-5.
44. Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d 20, paras. 4-7.
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outside of Canada where defendants were both Canadian and foreign.45 In
applying the Ontario rule, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between the

provincial and foreign-country defendants, permitting jurisdiction over the
Canadian defendants but not the foreign defendants. 46 The court observed that
as to interprovincial cases, the Canadian judicial structure was arranged such that
there was no basis for concern about differential qualities or substantial burdens
among provincial courts.47

Moreover, the court also recognized a distinction

between interprovincial and international cases with respect to choice of law,
stating there was "less need to worry about sovereignty or the difficulty of

applying 'foreign' law where
48 the act in question occurs in another province
rather than another country.,
Jurisdiction in Canada has been understood to require not only a "real and
49
substantial connection" but also to satisfy a standard of "order and fairness,"
although the relationship between those requirements was somewhat unclear and
remains unsettled after the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Club
Resorts. In any event, the inquiry into order and fairness had led courts in

45. Leufkens, 60 O.R. 3d 84, paras. 2-9; Lemmex, 60 O.R. 3d 54, paras. 2-11; Gajraj, 60
O.R. 3d 68, paras. 2-5; Sinclair,60 O.R. 3d 76, paras. 2-6.
46. See Leufkens, 60 O.R. 3d 84, para. 35; Lemmex, 60 O.R. 3d 54, para. 47.
47. See Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d 20, paras. 95, 97.
48. Id. at para. 97. The Court of Appeal in Charron-Van Breda modified the Muscutt test to
some degree, noting that factors such as whether the case was international or interprovincial and
other comity concerns would be considered as part of the "real and substantial connection" analysis
rather than as separate factors in a jurisdictional analysis. Charron Estate v. Village Resorts Ltd.
(2010), 98 O.R. 3d 721, paras. 106-08. The Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in Club
Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, affirming the Court of Appeal's rulings, did not address
the question of whether there should be a different standard for an international (as contrasted with
an interprovincial) case.
49. See generally Janet Walker, Beyond Real and Substantial Connection: The Muscutt
Quintet, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION 61, 74, 77 (Todd Archibald & Michael
Cochrane eds., 2002) (discussing Canadian courts' jurisdictional test).
50. Compare Janet Walker, Muscutt Misplaced: The Future of Forum of Necessity
Jurisdictionin Canada, 48 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 135, 136 (2009) (suggesting that the constitutional
requirement of order and fairness does not necessarily limit jurisdiction but may serve as a
framework for jurisdiction and allow for a forum of necessity jurisdiction), with Tanya J. Monestier,
A "Real and Substantial" Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 179, 185
(2007) ("[I]t is contrary to the very foundation of the real and substantial connection test for courts
to independently consider factors such as fairness to the individual litigants in evaluating
jurisdiction simpliciter."). In Club Resorts, the Canadian Supreme Court noted that:
[A] clear distinction must be maintained between, on the one hand, the factors or factual
situations that link the subject matter of the litigation and the defendant to the forum and,
on the other hand, the principles and analytical tools, such as the values of fairness and
efficiency or the principle of comity. These principles and analytical tools will inform
their assessment in order to determine whether the real and substantial connection test is
met.
Club Resorts Ltd., 2012 SCC 17, para. 79. The court also stated that principles such as fairness,
efficiency, or comity "may influence the selection of factors or the application of the method of
resolution of conflicts," and such concerns "might rule out reliance on some particular facts as
connecting factors." Id. at para. 84.
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Canada to call particular attention to the transnational case. In Muscutt, the
Court of Appeal for Ontario identified a multi-factor test that expressly includes
whether "the case is interprovincial or international in nature." 51 Two other
Muscutt factors-"[t]he court's willingness to recognize and enforce an extraprovincial judgment rendered on the same jurisdiction basis," and "[c]omity and
the standards of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement prevailing
elsewhere"52-have special resonance in the transnational case.

The first

requires the court to determine whether the court at the foreign defendant's home
would exercise jurisdiction in similar circumstances and whether a provincial
court would recognize a judgment rendered on those jurisdictional grounds.53
The second looks to whether the judgment in the Canadian province would be
recognized in the country where enforcement
of a judgment against the foreign
54
defendant would likely take place.
These aspects of the jurisdictional test in Canada made the jurisdictional
analysis even more speculative and costly than the present U.S. due process
analysis. There was often conflicting expert testimony about issues of mirrorjurisdiction and likely enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction; thus, the
jurisdictional inquiry was more complicated than it needed to be. This
complexity may explain why the Supreme Court of Canada decided to
reformulate its approach to jurisdiction more generally in its recent decision in
Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, decided just as this Article was going to print.
The Court expressed a desire to ensure greater predictability and consistency in
jurisdictional analysis and the need for greater direction on how to apply the
"real and substantial connection" test. To that end, the Court identified a list of
presumptive connecting factors that would constitute a "real and substantial
connection," observing that other factors might be identified over time. In
addition, the Court noted that the presumption is not irrebuttable, but that the
burden of rebutting it rests on the party challenging jurisdiction.
The
presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating that the presumptive connecting
factor does not point to any real relationship between the subject matter of
the
55
litigation and the forum or points only to a weak relationship between them.

51. Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d at 49. The Canadian Supreme Court had not formally adopted the
Muscutt factors, although Justice Bastarache cited the Muscutt factors approvingly in a Supreme
Court case involving choice of law. See Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870 (Can.), para. 45
(noting the eight Muscutt factors: "the connection between the forum and the plaintiff's claim; the
connection between the forum and the defendant; unfairness to the defendant in assuming
jurisdiction; unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction; the involvement of other parties
to the suit; the court's willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial judgment rendered
on the same jurisdictional basis; whether the case is interprovincial or international in nature; and
comity and the standard of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement prevailing elsewhere." (citing
Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d at 45-51)).
52. Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d at 48, 51.
53. Id. at 48-49, paras. 93-94.
54. Id. at51,para. 102.
55. Club Resorts Ltd., 2012 SCC 17, paras. 81-100.
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Comparisons Between the United States and Canada with Respect
to a Separate Standardfor TransnationalCases
a. The Relationship Between the Defendant and the Forum

The constitutional standard for jurisdiction as developed in Canada is
different from that in the United States in a number of ways. One key aspect of
the constitutional due process jurisdiction jurisprudence as developed in the
United States-and emphasized in both Goodyear and Nicastro-is the
emphasis on the connection between the forum and the defendant.56 Because it
is the defendant's relationship with the forum that is the "touchstone" of the U.S.
constitutional analysis, there is already a built-in concern for the defendant. In
Ontario (as in many other provinces), however, there are several broader rules
thought to justify the assertion of jurisdiction-for example, where the plaintiff
has suffered damages, 57 or where an out-of-province defendant would be a
necessary party to a proceeding in which a defendant was served in the
province -_andthus, perhaps a greater need for concern for a foreign defendant
in such a case. However, the Supreme Court of Canada, in its recent opinion in
Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, observed that the use of damage sustained in a

place as a connecting factor "risks sweeping into that jurisdiction claims that
have only a limited relationship with the forum" because the injury occurs in one
place but the pain and inconvenience resulting from it occurs in another country
and later in a third one.59 Accordingly, the Court held that the fact that damage
was sustained in the forum could not be accorded effect as a presumptive
connective factor (without distinguishing between the interprovincial or
international context). In affirming jurisdiction in both Charron and Van Breda,
the Supreme Court relied upon other connecting factors. In Charron, the fact
Mrs. Charron suffered damage in Ontario upon her return to Ontario after her
husband's death in Cuba did not constitute a presumptive connecting factor
within the meaning of the "real and substantial connection" test. However, the
Court found that the foreign defendant carried on business in Ontario and
derived benefits from the presence of an office in Ontario held out to the public
as representing the brand defendant used to promote its business, thereby
establishing a presumptive connecting factor. Because its business activities in
Ontario were directed at attracting Ontario residents to stay as paying guests at
the Cuban resort where the accident occurred, the claim was found to be related

56. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)
(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
57. See Ont. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, s. 17.02(h).
58. See id. at s. 17.02(o).
59. Club Resorts Ltd., 2012 SCC 17, para. 89. The Court of Appeal had also declined to give
presumptive effect to the factors set out in the Ontario Rules 17.02(h) (damage sustained in Ontario)
and 17.02(o) (necessary or proper party). Id. at para. 55.
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to the defendant's activities and the presumption was not rebutted. In Van
Breda, the Court found that there was a sufficient connection between the
subject matter of the litigation and Ontario on the basis of a contract made in
Ontario by an independent travel agent representing the foreign hotel and the
male of the couple, whether the benefit of the contract was extended to his
female partner.60
b.

The Relevance of Recognition and Enforcement

The experience in Canada also highlights the relationship between the rules
of direct jurisdiction and rules of indirect jurisdiction on recognition and
enforcement. As noted above, whether or not a potential Canadian judgment
would be recognized abroad had become part of the jurisdictional inquiry in
Canada. 61 And, although the issue of recognition and enforcement of a potential
judgment might have some influence on how jurisdictional rules are shaped and
is clearly significant as a practical matter to any lawyer bringing suit, there is no
reason why recognition and enforcement need be part of the formal jurisdictional
analysis. In many cases, particularly those against large multi-national
corporations with assets everywhere, recognition and enforcement of a judgment
will not be an issue. For example, a U.S. judgment rendered against a foreign
defendant will be able to be enforced against assets that the defendant has in the
United States. But in those cases where enforcement abroad will be necessary, a
U.S. judgment against a foreign-country defendant may never be enforced, and
this will be particularly true where U.S. jurisdiction is deemed exorbitant. 62 This
may be one reason to applaud the Supreme Court's decision in Goodyear, which
has potentially put limits on the ever expanding concept of general "doing
business" jurisdiction and brings general jurisdiction more closely in line with
that of other countries.
As for recognition and enforcement of a U.S. judgment abroad in a product
liability case like Nicastro, the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction would not be
perceived as exorbitant. As noted earlier, place of injury is a common basis of

60. Id. at paras. 114-23.
61. See supra text accompanying note 54. To what extent this will continue to be a part of
the jurisdictional analysis after the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Club Resorts Ltd. is
unclear. Club Resorts Ltd., 2012 SCC 17, para. 92. In another case, decided on the same day, the
Court assessed the enforceability abroad of a Canadian judgment as part of its forum non
conveniens analysis. Breeden v. Black, 2012 SCC 19, paras. 23, 35-36, available at Judgments of
the Supreme Court of Canada, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, http://scc.lexum.org/en/2012/
2012scc19/2012 sccl9.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). In Club Resorts, the Canadian Supreme
Court also rejected a forum non conveniens motion, identifying factors that may be considered on
such a motion, including the enforceability abroad of a Canadian judgment. Club Resorts Ltd.,
2012 SCC 17, para. 110.
62. See Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of JurisdictionalRules and Recognition Practiceon
International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327, 351 (2004)
[hereinafter Silberman, JurisdictionalRules and Recognition Practice].
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jurisdiction in most countries. To the extent there is resistance to the
enforcement of U.S. product liability judgments abroad, it is the result of other
aspects of U.S. litigation, such as63 the existence of rules of strict liability, broad
discovery, and large jury awards.
A misunderstanding about the relationship between an assertion of direct
jurisdiction and an acceptance of "indirect jurisdiction" in the context of
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may well have contributed to
64
the plurality's concerns about the reach of jurisdictional authority in Nicastro.
The plurality (as well as plaintiff's counsel in response to a question at oral
argument) assumed that if "purposeful availment" were found in the context of
an assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer McIntyre, a court
in the United States would have to "honor a judgment by a court of Madras
against an American manufacturer who had as little contact with Madras as
exists here.' 65 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her contribution to that
colloquy, courts in the United States presently have a liberal policy of
recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments. 66 And it is accurate
that under existing practice, courts have tended to adopt a "mirror image"
standard in assessing the jurisdiction of a foreign court. 67

But no such

equivalence is required. Under English law, for example, the liberal grounds
acceptable for assertions of direct jurisdiction of English courts are not regarded
as appropriate for a foreign court's exercise of jurisdiction to justify recognition
and enforcement in England; England accepts only the limited grounds of

63. See, e.g., Linda J.Silberman, Some Judgments on Judgments: A View from America, 19
KING'S L.J. 235, 245 (2008) [hereinafter Silberman, Some Judgments] (noting "a resistance to
enforcement of US judgments abroad on the basis of punitive damage awards or 'excessive' jury
verdicts in tort cases"); Joachim Zekoll, Recognition and Enforcement of American Products
Liability Awards in the Federal Republic of Germany, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 302 (1989)
(discussing issues that may prevent complete recognition and enforcement of U.S. products liability
judgments).
64. "Direct jurisdiction" is an assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant by a court in order to
provide a forum in which a plaintiff may bring its action. "Indirect jurisdiction" refers to the
authority exercised by a court of a country whose judgment is sought to be recognized or enforced
in another country.
65. During the oral argument, that question was posed by Justice Scalia to plaintiff's counsel.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, J.McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No.
09-1343) [hereinafter J. McIntyre Transcript]. During the subsequent colloquy, Justice Breyer also
expressed concerns about recognizing and enforcing a foreign judgment against an American
company when there was limited activity by the defendant. Id. at 34-35.
66. See id. at 35. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States is
generally a matter of state law. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in
the United States: In Search of Uniformity and InternationalAcceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
253, 262 (1991). The standards are reflected in common law decisions and in case law interpreting
the Uniform Acts-either the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962), or the
revised Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005). UNIF. FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. pt. 2, 43 (2002) [hereinafter UFMJRA]; UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. pt. 2, 21 (Supp. 2011)
[hereinafter UFCMJRA].
67. See Silberman, JurisdictionalRules and Recognition Practice,supra note 62, at 351, 353.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss3/8

12

Silberman: Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and Comp

20121

TRANSNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

presence, residence, and various forms of consent or submission as appropriate
68
jurisdictional bases for indirect jurisdiction.
The same is true in Switzerland,
where the jurisdictional grounds that will support a foreign judgment are more
restrictive than the rules under which a Swiss court will itself take jurisdiction in
cross-border cases. 69 In Canada, until the Supreme Court decisions in Morguard
Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye 70 and Beals v. Saldanha,71 the standards for
indirect jurisdiction with respect to recognition of interprovincial and foreigncountry judgments were substantially more limited than the rules for assertions
of direct jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Morguard and Beals's identification of a

correlation between the standards for direct and indirect jurisdiction, there may
remain distinctions between them.72 It may well be that the Justices who joined
the plurality in Nicastro had a sense that an assessment of the appropriate

extraterritorial reach of judicial jurisdiction could best be understood by viewing
it from the perspective of an American defendant that would be subject to
jurisdiction abroad.73 But they were wrong to have assumed that by upholding

jurisdiction they were necessarily endorsing a standard whereby a court in the
United States would be required to accept a foreign country's assertion of

jurisdiction on that basis at the recognition

and enforcement stage.74

Nonetheless, given the decision in Nicastro, U.S. manufacturers who sell

products abroad and are subject to suit at the place of injury in the absence of
targeting are unlikely to have a foreign judgment enforced against them in the
United States.

Thus, the Nicastro standard will also be the standard for

recognition and enforcement in the United States-clearly where the defendant
is a U.S. defendant and probably even where the defendant is foreign.

68. See 1 DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 14R-048, at 588-89
(Sir Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 14th ed. 2006).
69. See NOREL ROSNER, CROSS-BORDER RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
MONEY JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 301-02 (Ulrik Huber Institute for

Private Law, University of Groningen 2004).
70. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1092 (Can.) (interprovincial judgment).
71.
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 433 (Can.) (foreign-country judgment).
72. See Janet Walker, Are National Class Actions Constitutional? A Reply to Hogg and
McKee, 48 OSGOODE HALLL.J. 95, 119 (2010).
73. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality opinion).
74. Under present law, recognition and enforcement is a matter of state law. The UFMJRA
and the recent revision to that Act-the UFCMJRA-provide that a foreign-country judgment may
not be refused recognition if certain standards are met. See UFMJRA, supra note 66, § 5(a), at 73;
UFCMJRA, supra note 66, § 5(a), at 31. Place of injury is not one of the specified grounds,
although both Acts provide that other bases of jurisdiction may be recognized. See UFMJRA
§ 5(b); UFCMJRA § 5(b). As noted, most courts have found an acceptable basis of jurisdiction if
U.S. due process standards are satisfied. See Silberman, Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition
Practice,supra note 62, at 351-52.
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B. Looking Ahead: Asserting DirectJurisdiction

The Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of constitutional jurisdictional
reach in Nicastro may be the catalyst for federal legislation to change the result
to permit jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who exploits the U.S. market as a
whole. Certainly, there has been significant criticism of the plurality decision in
Nicastro,75 including a vigorous dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor. 76 McIntyre's counsel conceded in oral argument that the defendant
"wanted to sell its product anywhere that the distributor could find," but then
insisted that although the United States was "targeted" as the market, no
individual state was actually targeted.77 That argument is accepted by the
plurality, along with an elaborate discourse about the sovereign authority of the
individual states.78
As Justice Ginsburg's dissent argues, it is difficult to fathom how McIntyre
is not targeting each of the various states in the United States when it is
attempting to sell as many machines as it can in the U.S. market. 79 Moreover, as
she points out, New Jersey-which processes more metal than
any other U.S.
80
state-was an obvious target for sales of McIntyre's product.
The fact that foreign manufacturers usually target the United States as a
whole and not a particular state has led to proposals in the past to require foreign
manufacturers who have caused injury to U.S. plaintiffs in product liability cases
to answer in courts in the United States. As the federal rule makers did

75. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very PersonalPerspective, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 465 (2012); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481 (2012); John Vail, Six Questions in
Light ofJ. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REv. 517 (2012); Patrick J. Borchers, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (noting, with regard to McIntyre, that "[tihe Supreme Court
performed miserably"); Allan Ides, A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's Decision in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LoY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Alan B. Morrison,
The Impacts of Mclntrye on Minimum Contacts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011) (noting that
"the legal world surely would have been better off if [McIntyre] had never been decided"); Todd
David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 202, 241 (2011) (noting that McIntyre and Goodyear "may serve to increase the confusion of
the lower courts about the requirements for establishing both general and specific jurisdiction").
76. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. See J. McIntyre Transcript, supra note 65, at 5-7.
78. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789-90 (2011) (plurality opinion) ("[If another State
were to assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits
that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.
Furthermore, foreign corporations will often target or concentrate on particular States, subjecting
them to specific jurisdiction in those forums .... These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S.
market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey
market.").
79. See id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. See id.
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previously in Rule 4(k)(2) with respect to federal question cases, 81 proposed bills
for federal legislation focused on foreign defendant's contacts with the United
States as a whole. For example, a 1987 proposal would have authorized federal
court jurisdiction over foreign defendants who injured United States claimants in
the United States if the foreign defendants "knew or reasonably should have
' 82
known that the product would be imported for sale or use in the United States."
The bill would have made the federal court in the district in which the injury
occurred the appropriate United States court-in effect, a place of injury venue
rule to displace the broader venue option for alien defendants under § 1391(d).83
A more recent proposal is the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act
of 2011, 84 which would require foreign manufacturers that desire to distribute
certain products in the United States to establish registered agents in the United
States, specifically in a state with a "substantial connection to the importation,
distribution, or sale of the covered product." 85 Noting that many Americans are
unable to recover damages from foreign manufacturers for lack of jurisdiction
and that the inability to apply U.S. tort law to such manufacturers places
domestic manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage, 86 the bill seeks to ensure
that foreign manufacturers "are subject to the jurisdiction of State and Federal
courts in at least one State."87 Manufacturers would not be permitted to sell
certain products in the United States unless they registered an agent for service
of process and consented to the jurisdiction of the State in which the registered
agent is located.88
Although aimed in the right direction, the bill has several flaws, including
the failure to limit jurisdiction to cases where the injury occurs in the United
States as the result of the distribution of the product in the United States. 89 Also,
it appears to impact the jurisdiction of state courts, which may present some
federalism issues. More generally, however, the underlying philosophy of the

81. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
82. S. 1996, 100th Cong. (1987) (proposing 28 U.S.C. § 1658, entitled "Personal Jurisdiction
over Citizens or Subjects of Foreign States in Certain Actions"). See also H.R. 3662, 100th Cong.
(1987) (proposing a bill to amend U.S. District Court jurisdiction regarding certain actions
involving U.S. citizens and foreign persons).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2006).
84. See S. 1946, 112th Cong. (2011). Prior bills were introduced and hearings held in the
House and Senate in 2009 and 2010. See, e.g., Leveling the Playing Field and Protecting
Americans: Holding Foreign Manufacturers Accountable: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, S. 1606, 111th Cong.
(2009) (discussing defective products that are manufactured outside of the United States but cause
injuries to persons in the United States).
85. S.1946, § 5(a)(2).

86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. § (2).
Id. § (3).
Id.
See id. § 5(c)(1).

90. See id. § 8 (stating that this act trumps any provision of state law that is inconsistent with
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legislation, which is based upon "consent," highlights the tension that exists as
the result of Nicastro as to whether jurisdiction is to be considered a function of
"sovereign authority" and consent, as Justice Kennedy would have it,91 or
suggests.92
predicated upon minimum contacts and fairness, as Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Nicastro offers an interesting variation on the
concept of contacts with the United States as a whole. She would probably agree
that an approach that looked to the foreign defendant's contacts with the United
States as a whole would require action by Congress or the rule makers. Treating
contacts with the United States as a whole to assess due process may be sensible
as regards a foreign-country defendant with respect to its amenability to
jurisdiction in the United States, although there are specific concerns about the
exercise of general jurisdiction that indicate nationwide contacts should be
limited to the exercise of specific jurisdiction since the United States is likely to
have a more attenuated regulatory interest in providing a forum when general
jurisdiction is involved. As to specific jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg offers a
common-sense approach that does not require adoption of nationwide contacts
through federal legislation. With respect to a foreign-country manufacturer that
enlists a U.S. distributor to develop a market throughout the United States,
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Nicastro argues that such a manufacturer certainly
can be said to "purposefully avail[] itself' of a United States market nationwide
93
and therefore also of the state into which the product is sold and causes injury.
III. A

BRIEF

COMPARATIVE

LOOK

AT

JUDICIAL

JURISDICTION

IN

TRANSNATIONAL CASES

In assessing the Supreme Court's decisions in Goodyear and Nicastro, it is
useful to focus on some of the unique features of the United States jurisprudence
as compared with that of other systems. A transnational case offers the
opportunity to examine the values that underlie the framework of a jurisdictional
regime.

91. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-88 (2011) (plurality opinion).
Justice Kennedy refers to a defendant "submit[ting] to a State's authority" in a variety of ways,
including "submission through contact with and activity directed at a sovereign" with respect to
suits "connect[ed] with the defendant's activities" in the forum. Id.
92. Id. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the state of academic debate over
the role of consent in modern jurisdictional doctrines, the plurality's notion that consent is the
animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court. Quite the contrary,
the Court has explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are
sufficient; invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is unnecessary and
unhelpful.").
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That such a standard may still emerge is possible.
The two concurring Justices, Breyer and Alito, seem to have joined the plurality on the basis that
the record indicated only one machine was sold and shipped by the distributor into New Jersey. See
id. at 2791 (Breyer, J.& Alito, J., concurring). The additional facts about the New Jersey market,
such as the size and scope of New Jersey's scrap-metal business described in Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, were not sufficiently presented in the record. Id. at 2792.
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In the United States, it is the affiliation between the defendant and the forum
that is critical, and this is true for the interstate as well as the transnational case.
Whether the values reflected are those about sovereignty and consent to authority
or the sense of a fundamental principle of what is fair, remains clouded after the
two recent Supreme Court decisions. In a legal system such as that of France,
the interest of the state in providing a forum for its nationals-whether as
plaintiff or defendant-justifies the exercise of jurisdictional authority in certain
95
cases, 94 although there has been some pushback from that in recent decisions.
In other systems, the place where the events occur and where witnesses are
located are significant factors in shaping the rules of jurisdiction because of a
concern about litigational convenience and because those events provide a
regulatory justification to exercise authority over the matter.96 Often, the rules of
transnational jurisdiction in a particular country will reflect more than one of
these interests.
One can find the approach of many civil law countries reflected in the
approach of the European Regulation (the Brussels Regulation),97 keeping in

mind that it is a regional transnational regime rather than a broader set of
jurisdictional rules for all transnational cases. But it is a useful example because
the European Union (EU) rules are similar to the national jurisdictional rules of
many countries. Moreover, there is now an ongoing consideration of a "Recast"
of the Regulation where, if enacted, the Regulation would displace national rules
of judicial jurisdiction in all EU countries and, as reformulated and amended
with certain additions for defendants from third states, would apply to non-EU

94. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14, 15 (Fr.), translatedin THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE 4 (John
H. Crabb trans., rev. ed. 1995). Article 14 provides: "A foreigner, even if not residing in France,
may be cited before French courts for the execution of obligations by him contracted in France with
a Frenchman; he may be brought before the courts of France for obligations by him contracted in
foreign countries towards Frenchmen." Id. Article 15 provides: "A Frenchman may be brought
before a court of France for obligations by him contracted in a foreign country, even with a
foreigner." Id. Other rules of domestic jurisdiction set forth in Articles 42 through 48 of the New
Code of Civil Procedure-which include the place of performance of the contract or the place where
the wrongful act was done or loss or damage incurred-apply in international cases as well. See,
e.g., NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCIDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] arts. 46 (Fr.), available in English at Code
of Civil Procedure, LEGIFRANCE.GOUV.FR, 4-5 (Sept. 30, 2005), http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/
code_39.pdf.
95. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME.
L. REV. 473, 487-499 (2006) (providing an extensive survey of the past and current use of Article
14).
96. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 21(1) (Ger.),
translated in GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH 194
(Charles E. Stewart trans., 2001) [hereinafter GERMAN CIVIL PROCEDURE] (where a person
maintains a commercial establishment and the claim relates to the conduct of the business at such
establishment); Id. § 29(1) (for a dispute arising out of contractual relations or the existence thereof
at a place at which the obligation in dispute is to be performed); Id. § 32 (where the tort was
committed over complaints relating to torts).
97. EU Regulation, supranote 12.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2012

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 591

defendants, including U.S. defendants. 98 However, the views of some experts
invited by the European Parliament to comment on the Recast
Proposal indicate
99
reservations to a universal European approach to jurisdiction.
In general, the EU view is that litigation should take place at the home of the
defendant (i.e., its domicile) 1°° or in one of a limited number of places based on
particular events.101 As regards general jurisdiction-suit on any claini--the
domicile of a corporation or a legal entity is its statutory seat, or central
administration, or principal place of business.1°2 Thus it is substantially more
limited than the U.S. concept of general "doing business" jurisdiction, and much
closer to the notion of being sued at home. It is this "at home" concept that is
picked up by Justice Ginsburg in her opinion in Goodyear,103 and is the focus of
Professor Stein's paper in this Symposium. °4 As for specific jurisdiction, or as
the EU knows it, special jurisdiction, the occurrence of events in the forumsuch as the place of performance in a contract case, the place of the commission
of the tortious act or the effect of the injury in a tort case, 10 5 or claims arising

98. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(Recast), at 3, COM (2010) 748 final (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter EU Recast] (proposing changes to
the current Regulation, which only applies where the defendant is domiciled in the EU).
99. Among the criticisms are that unilateral renunciation of natural jurisdiction without
reciprocity is inappropriate, that certain jurisdictional rules were designed for the purpose of
European integration and not always appropriate to cover defendants domiciled in third states, and
the redesigned system could introduce new complexities. See Andrew Dickinson, Note on The
Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Council on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), 12 (Sept. 15,
2011), PE 453.200, [hereinafter Note on Recast], http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/
en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=49431; Alexander Layton, Note on Recast,
9-11 (Sept. 15, 2011), PE 453.203, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.
html?languageDocument=EN&file=49443; Illaria Pretelli, Note on Recast, 22-28 (Sept. 15, 2011),
PE
453.205,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?language
Document=EN&file=60669. Cf. Horatia Muir Watt, Note on Recast, 12-15 (Aug. 15, 2011), PE
453.199, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdown load.htmllanguageDocument
=EN&file=49450 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("There is no reason not to extend the existing rules, if
exclusion of foreign defendants no longer makes sense in view of the vastly accelerated and
interconnected economic and social context in which we now live.").
100. See EU Regulation, art. 2, supra note 12, at 3.
101. See, e.g., art. 5, id. at 4.
102. Art. 60, id. at 13.
103. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) ("A
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and
systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State."). Justice Ginsburg further
stated that "the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile;
for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home." Id. at 2853-54.
104. Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L.
REv. 527 (2012).
105. The European Court of Justice interpreted the provision in Article 5(3) of the EU
Regulation, that suit may be brought in matters of tort "'where the harmful event occurred' or may
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from the activities of a branch-are bases for jurisdiction because they offer a
litigation-convenient forum and because the state may have a regulatory interest
in asserting its authority.' °6 Specialized circumstances--concern for the "little
guy"-lead to specialized rules for maintenance creditors, 1°7 consumers, 10 8 and
insureds,1°9 who are permitted to sue defendants at the domicile of the plaintiff
(or habitual residence if it is a claimant seeking support). There is also a desire
to have a single litigation where there are multiple defendants, and that is the
policy behind the rule that confers jurisdiction over defendants when one
defendant is domiciled in the forum state, if the claims are closely connected and
it is expedient to hear them together to avoid irreconcilable judgments.' 10 For
similar reasons, another provision permits a person to be sued as a third party in
an action in a warranty or other third party proceedings in the court seized of the
the object of
original proceeding, unless the proceedings were instituted with
1'
undermining the jurisdiction of the otherwise competent court."
The overall effect of the Regulation is to identify a limited number of
possible fora from which a plaintiff can choose where to sue, thus minimizing
opportunities for forum shopping among the Member States. To the extent that
certain bases of jurisdiction are deemed inappropriate or "exorbitant," they are
expressly listed and prohibited.112 Exorbitant bases of jurisdiction include
nationality of the plaintiff, property of the defendant, and presence of the
defendant in the forum. 1 3 The EU rules (and many similar national rules) reflect
other values of civil law jurisprudence: there are formal rules imposed; there is
no overlay of residual constitutional limitation discretion, either through
overriding constitutional limitations on jurisdictional authority (such as through

occur," to refer to either the place of the tortious act or the place or the place of injury. Case 21fl6,
Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1743 (quoting EU Regulation, supra
note 12, at 4). However, in the specific context of defamation, the Court of Justice imposed a more
restrictive interpretation, holding that a plaintiff could sue at the place where the publisher of the
defamatory publication is established for all of the harm caused, but could only sue in the place of
distribution for the damage caused in that State, even if that State was the State of the plaintiff's
domicile or habitual residence. See Case C-68/93, Shevill v. Press Alliance S.A., 1995 E.C.R. I450, 1-465. In a recent case, the European Court modified that rule, in a case involving the alleged
infringement of personality rights by means of content placed on an internet website, to permit suit
to be brought for all of the damage in the place where the alleged victim has his centre of interests,
which will often correspond to the habitual residence. See Joined Cases C-509/09, eDate Adver.
GmbH v. X, 2011 E.C.R. __ & C-161/10, Martinez v. MGN Ltd., 2011 E.C.R. - at para. 52
availableat http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=509/09&td=ALL.
106. See EU Regulation, art. 5, supra note 12, at 4.
107. Art. 5(2), id.
108. Art. 15(1) & art. 16, id. at 6-7.
109. Art. 9(l)(b), id. at5.
110. Art. 6(1), id. at 4-5.
111. Art. 6(2), id. at 5.
112. See Annex 1, id.at 18. Of course, any ground of jurisdiction not provided for in the
Regulation is also prohibited.
113. Id.
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the Due Process Clause in the United States or order and fairness in Canada 14)
or through retained discretion to resist the exercise of jurisdiction because
another forum is more desirable (as in the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens). The EU does reinforce its emphasis on the avoidance of forum
shopping and limited fora by adopting a strict first-in time lis pendens rule for
situations 5 in which parallel litigation involving the same claims may be
brought."
The EU Recast offers an interesting perspective in thinking about
transnational cases. By establishing "European rules" for jurisdiction, the Recast
would eliminate various exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction now contained in
the national laws of various EU countries. 116 Thus, for example, the French
Article 14 nationality of the plaintiff basis of jurisdiction is eliminated, as is
Article 23 of the German Code, permitting jurisdiction on the basis of the
presence of property in the forum, as well as transient (presence) jurisdiction in
the United Kingdom. Most of the jurisdictional provisions now found in the EU
Regulation are extended to reach defendants domiciled in third countries.
Interestingly, however, Article 6(1), which provides for jurisdiction over
multiple defendants when any one of them is domiciled in the EU, is only
applied to other defendants domiciled in the EU. 117 This exception may suggest
a special concern for the burdens on a non-EU defendant.
Although eliminating some exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, the proposed EU
Recast also reflects the view that more expansive jurisdiction may be necessary
when there is no Member State that can take jurisdiction. 118 The Recast provides
that in such a situation, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member State
where property belonging to the defendant is located, provided that the value of
the property is not disproportionate to the value of the claim and there is a
sufficient connection with the forum. 19 Similarly, a forum necessitatis may be a
basis for jurisdiction when no Member State otherwise has jurisdiction and the
right to access to justice is required because proceedings cannot reasonably be
brought in a third State with which the dispute is closely connected, or a
judgment given in a third State would not be entitled to recognition and
enforcement, and the dispute has a sufficient connection with the forum Member
State. 120

114. See Walker, supra note 49, at 77.
115. EU Regulation, art. 27, supra note 12, at 9. In addition, where a related (but not the
same) action is pending in the court of a different Member State, "any court other than the court
first seised may stay its proceedings." Art. 28, id. (emphasis added).
116. Not only are courts permitted to exercise such exorbitant jurisdiction against non-EU
defendants, but the recognition of judgment provisions of the EU Regulation require Member States
to recognize the judgment of a foreign state against defendants from third states. See EU
Regulation, art. 33, supra note 12, at 10 (subject to limited exceptions in Art. 34-35).
117. EU Recast, art. 6(1), supra note 98, at 25.
118. See art. 25, id. at 33-34.
119. Id.
120. Art. 26, id. at 34.
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This "access to justice" principle is not new to the proposed EU Recast. For
example, the Swiss have a similar provision which provides: "If this statute does
not provide for jurisdiction in Switzerland, and proceedings abroad are
impossible or highly impracticable, jurisdiction lies with the Swiss judicial
has a sufficient
authorities or administrative
' 121 authorities at the place which
connection with the case."
As one sees from this brief comparative sketch, the rules of international
jurisdiction in many countries are for the most part much more expansive than
those in the United States. The constitutional due process status accorded to
judicial jurisdiction in the United States-and its concomitant focus on the
forum's connection to the defendant-make it impossible in the United States to
make the kinds of policy choices allowing maintenance creditors or consumers
many other jurisdictional regimes permit. Perhaps that
to sue at home -22-as
requirement-of purposeful conduct by the defendant with the forum-turns out
to be particularly appropriate in the context of foreign defendants-when one
considers the exceptionalism of the U.S. procedural regime. In that sense,
Justice Ginsburg's concern about "disadvantage" to U.S. plaintiffs 123 overlooks
some of the differences between litigating in the United States and litigating in
Europe, where there tends to be a more harmonized and accepted set of
procedural norms.
The one area of jurisdiction where the assertion of jurisdiction by courts in
the United States is substantially broader than that of many other countries is the
general doing business jurisdiction-that is, where jurisdiction may be asserted
on the basis of defendant's substantial activity in the forum state, even when the
claim is unrelated to those activities. 124 The underlying rationale for such
jurisdiction is that the extensive and continuous activities in the forum state by
the defendant represent a manifestation of the defendant's presence thereanalogous to the physical presence or domicile of an individual. Interestingly,
Justice Ginsburg talks about the paradigm forum for an individual being that of
domicile, and then goes on to say the "ecuivalent place" is one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as "at home"; 25 she then identifies domicile, place

121. Lol FEDIRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI [PIL] [FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 3 (Switz.), translated in SWITZERLAND'S
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE 1987, at 30 (Pierre A. Karrer & Karl. W. Arnold, trans.
1989).
122. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97, 101 (1978) ("But the mere act of
sending a child to California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent
to obtain or expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the
assertion of that State's judicial jurisdiction.").
123. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
124. For earlier discussions of the general "doing business" jurisdiction, see Patrick J.
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 137 (2001); Mary
Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Cml. LEGAL F.
171 (2001).
125. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011).
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of incorporation and principal place of business as "paradigm" bases for the
exercise of general jurisdiction.' 26 Justice Ginsburg does not mention the
concept of "presence" or "tag,"' 27 which has always seemed to me the closer
parallel with "systematic and continuous activities" in an attempt to find an
analogue to the physical presence of the individual. Professor Stein posits that
the Supreme Court in Goodyear seeks a proxy for "home" as a place to sue a
corporation; 128 if he is correct, there is a tension with the Supreme Court's earlier
opinion in Burnham.129 More likely, Goodyear will be read to identify a place
where the corporation can be said to be "present" in the same way that the
physical presence of the individual defendant is manifest. Whether Goodyear
will lead to clarification of the current mystifying case law remains to be seen.
Supreme Court guidance on what constitutes sufficient activities for general
jurisdiction has been quite limited. On one end of the spectrum is Perkins v.
Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co.,130 where the entire operations of a Philippines
corporation that had been closed down during the Japanese occupation and
moved to Ohio, were considered sufficient for general jurisdiction. 13 In those
circumstances, the application of general jurisdiction was quite close to the more
internationally accepted bases of jurisdiction over corporate defendants, such as
place of incorporation, principal place of business, or central administration.
Moreover, given the era in which Perkins was decided, an even somewhat more
expansive definition of general jurisdiction would have filled a gap at a time
when specific jurisdiction had not yet emerged. At the other end of the spectrum
is Helicopteros v. Hall,132 where the activity-which consisted of purchases of
helicopters and equipment from a Texas company along with sending pilots for
training and33 some contract negotiations-was held to be constitutionally
insufficient.'
Using those parameters, Goodyear was an easy case. Mere sales into the
forum state whether direct or as part of the stream of commerce would not seem
to manifest the presence of the corporation there. Indeed, the result should not
change even under a theory of aggregate contacts that measured the contacts of
the foreign Goodyear subsidiaries with the United States as a whole.

126. Id.
127. Jurisdiction based on service of a summons on the defendant due to temporary presence
in the state-so-called "tag" jurisdiction-was upheld by the Supreme Court in Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619, 625 (1990).
128. Stein, supra note 104, at 543, 545-48.
129. Burnham was a domestic U.S. case and did not involve jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608. Also, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES (published pre-Burnham)took the position that such transitory
presence is not an appropriate basis of jurisdiction under international law principles. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (1987).

130.
131.
132.
133.

342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Id. at447-48.
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Id. at 411,418-19.
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Whether Justice Ginsburg's unanimous opinion for the Court, with its
multiple references to the corporation being sued "at home," signifies a
requirement of some type of physical manifestation-as there was in Perkins-is
not clear. But if such a requirement were to emerge, it would make tag
jurisdiction and doing business jurisdiction closer equivalents.
Such a
requirement would increasingly align the United States with rules of general
jurisdiction over corporations elsewhere. Some countries, such as Germany,
limit suit against a corporation to its statutory seat. 134 Article 60 of the EU
Regulation defines the domicile of a corporation as the place where it has its
statutory seat, central administration, or principal place of business. 135 In both

Germany and the EU, a foreign defendant is subject to jurisdiction if it has
created an "establishment" in the forum, but only if the claim is directly related
to the activities of the branch office or other establishment136-an example of

specific and not general jurisdiction. England, in its national law, does permit
general jurisdiction over foreign defendants who are physically present in the
forum. 1 As to presence for a corporation, England requires there to be a fixed

"place of business"-some kind of physical manifestation-in order for the
38
forum to assert general jurisdiction over a foreign company.'
An advantage of a physical presence requirement for general jurisdiction in
the United States would eliminate much of the indeterminacy of the doing
business jurisdiction. Doing business is in the first instance a matter of state law,
and thus there is no uniform standard. And at the constitutional due process
level, the Supreme Court decisions, which are few and far between, have not
offered much guidance. Another open issue with respect to doing business
jurisdiction relates to when a multi-national corporation that has subsidiaries
located in the United States will be regarded as itself doing business in the
United States. 139 A variation of this "group of companies" or "single enterprise"

134. See GERMAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 96, § 17(1).
135. EU Regulation, art. 60, supra note 12, at 13.
136. See GERMAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 96, § 21(1); EU Regulation, art. 5(5), supra
note 12, at 4.
137. See 1 DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 346 (Sir Lawrence Collins et
al. eds., 14th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011).
138. Id.
139. Although the presence of a subsidiary alone does not establish the parent corporation's
presence in the state, see Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998), the
interrelationship of business activities between the corporation may be sufficient to make the
subsidiary subject to jurisdiction, see Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd. 385 F.2d 116, 120-21
(2d Cir. 1967) (discussing company's agent actions in relation to the "doing business" test). See
generally Obligationsof a Company Belonging to an InternationalGroup and Their Effect on Other
Companies of that Group, in 65-1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 191-326
(1993); Obligations of Multinational Enterprises and Their Member Companies, in 66-11
ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 463-73 (1996).
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doctrine might have been addressed in the Goodyear decision, but it was not
4
raised below or in the petition, and thus the Court said the point was forfeited.' 0
The expansive interpretations of doing business jurisdiction in the United
States have been a source of criticism abroad. In the international context, multinational defendants with offices or extensive activities in the United States have
been sued in the United States on claims that bear no relationship to their
activities in the United States. 141 In the recent negotiations for a world-wide
jurisdiction and judgments convention at the Hague Conference, efforts were
made to curtail that type of jurisdiction by placing it on the prohibited list. 142
The United States objected,
43 and this was one of the issues over which the Hague
negotiations broke down. 1
As a practical matter, the doctrine of forum non conveniens curbs some of
the excesses of general jurisdiction, 144 although a dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds is less likely if the plaintiff is a U.S. resident. There are
other hurdles that may face a lawyer who seeks to ground an action in the United
States on doing business jurisdiction. A judgment based on such jurisdiction is
unlikely to be enforced by any other country, and if the defendant does not have
assets in the United States, enforcement of such a judgment elsewhere is
unlikely. In some cases, of course, the foreign defendant will have assets in the
United States and then enforcement abroad will be unnecessary. Moreover,
some courts have required garnishees, including foreign banks subject to
jurisdiction in the United States, to turn over assets of the judgment debtor that
they hold outside of the forum state, thereby providing an enforcement
45
mechanism even when the foreign debtor and the assets are outside the state. 1
A nationwide "doing business standard" that requires some type of office or
physical manifestation of the corporation's presence might bring a greater
measure of predictability to assertions of general jurisdiction, and perhaps
subsequent cases will so interpret Goodyear. To the extent that the requirement
is to be one of "bricks and mortar," the "presence" of the corporation will
necessarily be that with a particular state, and an aggregate contacts theory for
general jurisdiction would seem unnecessary. Should courts in the aftermath of
Goodyear continue to view general jurisdiction as based on a more amorphous
set of "systematic and continuous contacts," an aggregate theory of contacts
would be inappropriate for a jurisdiction ground that is already suspect abroad.

140. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (citing Brief
for Respondents at 43, Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 5125441, at *43).
141. See Twitchell, supra note 124, at 173.
142. For a more elaborate discussion of the negotiations over that provision, see Linda
Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 338-46 (2002).
143. See id.
144. Id. at 344. See also Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of
General Jurisdiction,41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1055 (2004).
145. Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009).
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As transnational cases, both Goodyear and Nicastro raise issues that are
different from the classic interstate case and were deserving of more
consideration in that context. Perhaps this Symposium panel will facilitate more
conversation on that front.
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